



REGIONAL PROGRAM OF ACTION FOR PEACE AND SECURITY

SUB-PROGRAM OF ACTION FOR JOINT SECURITY MANAGEMENT OF COMMON BORDERS

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JOINT SECURITY MANAGEMENT OF COMMON BORDERS (GENERAL PROJECT CONCEPT)

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1. The political context of the GL: A Situational Analysis

Border zones continue to constitute security threats to states and communities in the entire Great Lakes Region (GLR). These include cross-border attacks by armed groups and communities straddling the borders, smuggling, motor vehicle thefts, drug trafficking, flow of small arms, land mines and now threats of terror networks. Border spaces are made ideal for these activities by existing obstacles to accessibility (terrain, forests, and deserts) and absence of penetrative transport and communication. All states in the Great Lakes region suffer from a limited capacity to control and monitor their porous borders. Despite the presence of customs officials, inherent weaknesses prevail, ranging from lack of material and infrastructure to human resource feebleness.

Responses to these threats have been basically state-based and have tended to generate security dilemmas and complexities. In the case of security dilemmas, every state action such as accumulation of arms and positioning of troops is viewed with suspicion eliciting an immediate counter-reaction. Complexities are a result of existence of ethnic communities living on both sides of the border (thus creating vectors through which conflicts traverse borders), armed communities and insurgent groups. The net effect is that conflicts flow back and forth across the borders. Self-help approaches deny states the opportunity of pooling their resources together for effective border security management. For instance, instead of CAR and Sudan pulling resources together to secure their 1200km frontier, each undertakes this role on its own engendering increased costs and reduced capacity.

2. Specific Problem to be addressed

Past and current conflicts that engulf and threaten the region can be attributed to a considerable extent to the inability of states to manage their frontiers. Border zones remain crush points of conflicts. Given the failure of self-help approaches that perceive borders as nation-state responsibility to provide adequate security for the state, community and region, we must pose to ponder whether a regional approach can provide a sustainable security.

Public goods here are those types of values which consequent to cooperation among states end up with enhanced benefits for all actors involved. Once provided, public goods have the logic of being enjoyed by many. They generate many benefits, just as their negative uses equally generate far-reaching consequences. Among the communities in this region, public goods include pastures, water, security and markets. States could address state, regional and community security through regionalization of border security management. The core questions to address are; what are the conditions for inter-state, inter-community cross border co-operation for enhancing border security? What regional frameworks are conducive to the realization of border security management promoting regional stability and development? What capacity assets are needed for this? This project design responds to the foregoing questions.

It essentially;

- a) Outlines conditional components for inter-state and cross border community interactions for border security management;

- b) Conceptualizes a regional institutional approach to border security management;
- c) Outlines capacity assets needed for the realization of border security management.

3 From state to region-based Border Security Management

3.1 A Review of Border Security Management Frameworks

To situate the rationale of the IC/GLR initiative, an examination of state based initiatives at border security management is necessary. Core institutions in the region include the EAC (Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania) IGAD (Kenya, Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti) and CEPGL (Rwanda, DRC, and Burundi). There is also COMESA and SADC. While DRC, Rwanda, Zambia, Uganda, Kenya, Sudan and Burundi belong to the former, only DRC, Zambia and Tanzania belong to SADC. Republic of Congo and CAR do not belong to any of these structures. These institutions were set up to facilitate economic integration. Little attention was focused on cross border conflicts and their management. Over time, attempts have been made to address this weakness. Angola, Tanzania and Zambia became signatories to the SADC protocol on control of firearms, ammunition and other related materials in the SADC Region. In the Central African belt, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) set up the COPAX, a sub-regional mechanism to promote peace and security. In the Eastern part of Africa, IGAD set up a Conflict Early Warning System (CEWARN). It is their inability to address conflict in the Great Lakes Region (GLR) that has motivated the need for a regional framework.

Attempts at inter-state level of cooperation generated several initiatives. There is for instance, the East African Protocol on Free Movement of People, the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in the DRC (which called for cessation of hostilities, disengagement and disarmament of non signatory forces and the initiation of Inter-Congolese Dialogue) and the Pretoria Accord (that called for withdrawal of foreign forces from the DRC). Other initiatives include cross-border pursuits granted to Uganda by Sudan and which Rwanda has requested to DRC and one that permits her (Rwanda) to put her troops under the command of DRC commanders. Despite their successes, they are limited by the lack of trust. Their operationalization is based above all on the willingness of individual states to cooperate. Nothing stops any signatory from refusing to implement them. This factor underlines the need for a wider framework that seeks to tie states in one arrangement for the collective good of all.

The failure of bilateral initiatives to resolve border security issues with regional dimensions has also fostered regional cooperation in the management of security. The memorandum of understanding seeking the establishment of an intelligence analysis cell to help DRC, Rwanda and Uganda to analyze intelligence signed on 23 February 2005 and the EAC mechanism for cooperation under Art. 123 on the evolution of common security and foreign policy are examples of these. While they can be applauded for going beyond bilateralism, they cannot be relied upon to deal with regional border security management. Issues to be handled are not only limited but are also confined to the level of cooperation. Border security is not perceived as a

common regional public good. Cooperation here seeks to merely enhance self-help efforts. The Nanyuki MoU on the Regional Counter Terrorism Strategy goes far to affirm regional collaboration by calling for the setting up of relevant structures of cooperation on a regional strategy for fighting international terrorism. It brings together Rwanda, Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan, Burundi, DRC, Tanzania, Egypt, Somaliland, Zambia, Botswana and Kenya. It commits them to reinforcing border security, sensitization of the public on terrorism, exchange of information, enhancement of capacity to fight terrorism and the creation of a regional center for coordinating anti-terrorism activities¹. Its main weakness lies in the fact that it is focused on one single issue and that it is externally driven and dependent. Another single issue driven protocol is the Nairobi Declaration on the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons in the GLR, signed in March 2000 and the April 2004 Protocol on the prevention, control, and reduction of small arms and light weapons in the GLR and the Horn of Africa. Signatories include Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, DRC, Sudan and Kenya.

The existence of these initiatives points to the general concern of border-generated insecurities. Yet their multiplicity and indeed the persistence of the problem of border insecurity characterized by the intensity of small arms trafficking, smuggling, rebel activities call for a wider regional mechanism. The Great Lakes conflict saw the AU proposing the setting up of an Eastern Brigade whose headquarters are in Kenya. States envisioned to constitute it are: Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, Burundi, Tanzania, Eritrea, Djibouti and DRC. However the Brigade is set out to facilitate regional intervention to contain conflicts. It is thus not envisaged for border security management.

The fact that the existing structures do not include all the 11 states of the IC/GLR, calls for the conceptualization of a framework within which border and other security and conflict related issues can be coordinated. The IC/GLR should be seen as a step in addressing this problem. Its main challenge is that of evolving formalized border security management mechanisms that incorporate the entire GLR, while building on existing tri-state (within certain zones, i.e. Rwanda, DRC and Uganda) and bilateral arrangements.

3.2 Of the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration and conditions for setting up Border Security Management

In recognition of the existing security complexes, the Heads of State from the Great Lakes met in Dar-es-Salaam in November 2004 and signed the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration, committing them to principles on peace, security, democracy and development in the region². Paragraphs 19, 21, 23 and 24 clearly set out the security architecture that the states seek to put in place in the GLR. For instance, in paragraph 19 of the document, state leaders commit themselves to setting up a regional security framework for prevention, management and peaceful settlement of conflicts. In Paragraph 21, mention is made to enhancement of cooperation in defense and security in a bid to promote confidence building. Reference is equally made to the need of establishing policies, measures and mechanisms aimed at

¹ See Memorandum of Understanding on the Regional Counter Terrorism Strategy, 2.-6 August, 2004, Nanyuki, Kenya.

² See Dar es Salaam declaration on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes: 19-20 November 2004.

enhancing good neighborliness and multi-sectoral cooperation. In paragraph 22 there is commitment on the need to set up a framework for containing the flow of arms. This is a reference to border security management. Paragraph 23 specifically addresses the issue of security on common borders. It calls for the setting up of management strategies while paragraph 24 commits states to prevent any direct or indirect support or delivery of arms to armed groups operating in the region.

The Dar-es-Salaam Declaration notably outlines a vision for border security management for sustainable peace and development in the region. This consists of several assets that constitute border security infrastructures. The Declaration equally sets out the framework within which rules, norms and values that support the principles of non-aggression and mutual defense are to be built. The Declaration seeks to build confidence and mutual trust among states. The inclination is towards the formation of border security structures borne out of benefits expected to emerge, in comparison to prevailing state based costly and competitive security management.

4. Project Rationale

While the wish to evolve border security management is present, it is constrained by the lack of broad-based regional structures. Indeed cooperation is hampered by the uniqueness of different border points. There are also other constraining issues such as; weak state institutional capacity in some of the states that constrain frontier security cooperation; presence of armed and region-destabilizing negative forces; mutual suspicions and low levels of trust among states; the multiplicity of structures and externally driven initiatives. The purpose of this project is to take into cognizance these dynamics, while developing a framework within which states can maximize on their resources and regional policy perspective to evolve alternative mechanisms for handling border security.

5. Strategy for Operationalizing the Project

5.1 Dynamics of the Zones and Areas

Security issues assume varied forms in different parts of the Great Lakes Region. This provides challenges and opportunities for the evolution of region wide border security management structures. This calls for the dissection of the region, based on their unique characteristics and security problems. In this connection, a total of 12 triangles can be discerned. It is on these triangles that we seek to build 12 corresponding security zones.

These are Zone 1 (Uganda, Rwanda and DRC), Zone 2 (Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania), Zone 3 (Uganda, Kenya, Sudan and *Ethiopia*), Zone 4 (Sudan, Uganda and DRC), Zone 5 (Sudan, CAR and DRC), Zone 6 (RoC, DRC and CAR), Zone 7 (DRC, RoC and Angola), Zone 8 (DRC, Zambia and Angola), Zone 9 (Tanzania, DRC, Burundi and Zambia), Zone 10 (DRC, Burundi and Rwanda), Zone 11 (Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda) and Zone 12 (Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi). Joint border security management here presupposes cooperation in management of border triangles/zones. Each zone or triangle is not built around the states as complete units but rather their provinces/districts neighboring other states. They are built around points of inter-section of mainly three states (even though there are exceptions i.e. zone 9 which implicates 4 states that share Lake Tanganyika).

Zone 1: Zone Volcano (Uganda, Rwanda and DRC)

This zone is currently the most volatile. It is characterized by security complexities and dilemmas. The main complexity are the many actors involved in the multiple conflicts involving state and communities; the modes of engagement (mainly militarized); weak state institutional reach; mutual suspicion and mistrust and the kin-country factor. The conflicts in this zone have their roots in the crisis of governance that engendered conflicts and refugees since the late 1950s. Consequently to the collapse of the Rwandan state in 1994 and its resultant genocide, EX-FAR, *Interahamwe* and *Impuzamugabi* take refuge in the DRC. Their re-organization, re-arming and attacks on Rwanda generated the 1996 and 1998 wars in the Great Lakes. The presence of groups like the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) was at the roots of Uganda's entry into the DRC. *Interahamwe* and the EX-FAR, who currently operate under the name FDLR/FOCA, still constitute the greatest destabilizing factor in zones 1 and 10. Underlying their threat is the fact that unlike other negative forces operating from the DRC, FDLR/FOCA are well organized under a military structure with two divisions, respectively in the North and South Kivu. They occupy a specific territory from which they are able to sustain themselves through predation on the local communities³. Not only they are able to threaten Rwanda's security but they continue to sow chaos and death in the zones they occupy. Their presence and activities continues to undermine attempts at pacification of the DRC territory, critical for holding of free and fair elections. North Kivu is also home to forces opposed to Uganda such as the PRA and ADF.

The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement set out a Joint Verification Mechanism between Rwanda and DRC. This has however been bogged down by low levels of trust, surveillance capacity and resources. The international community has been slow in responding to the critical question of disarming negative forces as stipulated in the Lusaka Agreement. This was followed by the Pretoria Accord which equally called for disarmament (Para 8.1 and 8.3) and the withdrawal of Rwandan forces and the disarmament of *Interahamwe* by the DRC⁴. While Rwandan forces were withdrawn, the disarmament of the negative forces did not take place. It is this failure that fosters the current tensions in these zones. Threats by both Rwanda and Uganda to deal with armed groups have animated renewed interests to have these groups disarmed. The AU, through its Peace and Security Council meeting in Libreville in March 2005, committed itself to forcefully disarm the negative forces in the eastern DRC.

Attempts at containing inter-state conflicts and negative forces in the region have entailed the setting up of a Tri-Partite Agreement on Regional Security in the Great Lakes amongst the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda in 2004, which is facilitated by the US. It constitutes a mechanism to address among other objectives⁵ regional instability and a process of political and diplomatic rapprochement. The main implementation mechanism is a Joint Commission, which consists of a council of Minister from the Member countries. In August 2005 Burundi was accepted as a full participant in all the activities of the Tri-Partite Joint Commission. One of its specific

³ See Project proposal on Disarmament and Repatriation of all armed groups in accordance with the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.

⁴ See Pretoria Agreement, the final report of the Third Party Verification Mechanism.

⁵ See the Tripartite Agreement on Regional Security in the Great lakes amongst the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda.

aims is to complete the tasks of the 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the 2002 Pretoria Agreement, and the 2002 Luanda Agreement.

In terms of border posts, Rwanda for instance has respectively 5, 4, and 1 border posts with DRC, Burundi and Uganda. The borders are long and characterized by difficult terrain. While border posts can deal with formal migration and trade movement, smuggling naturally continues unchecked. There is also the constant flow of refugees. No demarcation has taken place on Uganda –DRC border. DRC points at existing tensions in Ituri, North and South Kivu which are at the border with Rwanda. It also points at the lack of demarcation of her borders with her neighbors.⁶ In the Ituri area, attempts at disarmament risk being derailed by the inability of the international community to address the needs of the disarmed ex-combatants. What is also notable is the current weak capacity of DRC state institutions to assure security on its territory. This factor calls for external support to enhance this capacity.

IC/GLR member states consider addressing these problems vital for peace, security and development in the region and have therefore decided to embark on a special project for “Disarmament and Repatriation of all Armed Groups in accordance with the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement” (IC/GLR Project no. 1.1.1), which is part and parcel of the IC/GLR border security management concept as described in this document.

Zone 2: EAC - Lake Sango Triangle (Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania)

The common denominator in this zone is the failure of states to demarcate the borders within Lake Sango (Victoria). Conflicts here revolve around access to fish resources. The states here are cooperating within the EAC framework. Formalized cooperation here would contain smuggling. Bilateral arrangements within this framework would also facilitate collaboration around the coastal borderline. On their common borders, these states have to deal with motor vehicle thefts, flow of small arms and cattle thefts.

Zone 3: The Kapototur⁷ Cradle of Man Triangle (Uganda, Kenya, Sudan and Ethiopia)

The north eastern Uganda, north western Kenya, the south eastern Sudan and south western Ethiopia continue to be characterized by contestation among pastoralist groups, whose logic for socio economic reproduction revolves around movement in search for pastures and water alongside with extreme levels of cattle predation. Absence of state presence, socio-economic infrastructure and influx of small arms has generated high levels of violence in the region. The Sudanese side of the borders equally suffers from land mines. There are also huge movements of refugees seeking to return home. Given the lack of state capacity to provide security to their citizens, strategies previously adopted include the setting up of self defense units. The Kenya Police reservists belong to this category. Poor leadership and control of these units are further reasons of insecurity. Cross border raids and predation have increased in intensity costing lives and loss of economic livelihoods. In view of the urgency of these problems prevailing in zone 3, IC/GLR member states have adopted

⁶ See DRC: Answers to the questions of TTF, Peace and Security Commission.

⁷ Reference to Karamojong, Pokot, Toposa and Turkana tribes.

a proposal by the three states in the zone to embark on a special project for “Disarmament of Armed Nomadic Pastoralists and the Promotion of Sustainable Development in Zone 3” (IC/GLR Project no. 1.1.2), which is equally part and parcel of the IC/GLR border security management concept as described in this document.

Zone 4: The West-Nile Triangle (Sudan, Uganda and DRC)

Border insecurity in this zone has roots in three levels of conflict: the conflict in DRC, pitting several ethnic factions in north eastern Congo; the civil war in Sudan between the government and the SPLA and the externally backed LRA banditism in Northern Uganda. Rebel groups in West Nile were contained by a peace process. The borders here are equally long. The entire triangle is characterized by the absence of effective state control and penetration. Currently, the main border security problem revolves around LRA infiltration, influx of small arms, smuggling from the DRC. The only meaningful border security arrangement was signed in 2003 between Uganda and Sudan ensuring the former right of pursuit into Sudan. Uganda equally elaborated the Border Seal (BOSEAL) - a security friendly infrastructural penetration process that entailed building roads to facilitate troop mobility and flexibility in (re)deployment. There hasn't been demarcation of border in this triangle

Zone 5: River Oubangui Corridor (Sudan, CAR and DRC)

This zone is also characterized by lack of penetrative communication infrastructure. It is a huge frontier convergence. CAR's border with DRC is separated by the Oubangui River that is least policed, due to civil wars in DRC, CAR and Sudan. This factor has facilitated smuggling activities, trafficking of arms and cross border insurgence, maximizing the kin-country phenomenon. This zone equally experiences poaching activities which have brought havoc on elephants in the CAR. There are only 8 security posts along DRC-CAR border. CAR has 1200Km border with Sudan. Like the frontier with DRC, CAR has had to deal with refugees and circulation of small arms from Sudan. It is notable that there are only three border posts along the CAR-Sudan Border⁸.

Zone 6: Equator Triangle (RoC, DRC and CAR)

All these states are emerging from internal conflicts. They are afflicted by influx of small arms, smuggling activities of timber and minerals. Their borders are long and are not adequately monitored.

Zone 7: The Atlantic Triangle (DRC, RoC and Angola)

After the civil war, the security situation has continued to improve significantly. Currently there are no active armed groups. The triangle suffers from land mines planted during the conflicts that engulfed the Republic of Congo and Angola. Furthermore, states can hardly hamper smuggling diamonds and drug trafficking. Like the other zones, the long borders continue to constrain states from assuming an effective control, although there are border accords signed in 1999 involving the DRC, Angola and the Republic of Congo on the management of border security.

⁸ See CAR; International Conference on Great Lakes Region, TTTF: Peace and Security, answers to the questionnaire.

These accords are likely to be enhanced by the on going IC/GLR border security initiative.

Zone 8: The Benguela Corridor (DRC, Zambia and Angola)

The corridor lacks adequate modern infrastructure for border control purposes. The end of the Angolan civil war, which culminated in the signing of an accord with UNITA, in April 2002, has created a peaceful environment for co-existence. The corridor however requires a thorough de-mining exercise. It also continues to experience refugee movements and extensive banditry activities.

Zone 9: Lake Tanganyika Corridor (Tanzania, DRC, Burundi and Zambia)

It is characterized by a long borderline of both land and lake. State surveillance is limited. This factor has enabled non-state actors to smuggle arms into Burundi with ease. Burundi has 17 border posts, which it considers to be inadequate. The Zone is characterized by the problem of refugee flows, armed groups and landmines along Burundi's frontier with Tanzania⁹. There is also smuggling of economic goods and drugs. Currently, there are four border posts between Zambia and Tanzania. Out of the four, only two are operating with full capacity. There is an ongoing modernization exercise to operationalize two more border posts at full capacity¹⁰.

Zone 10: Zone CEPGL (DRC, Burundi and Rwanda)

This zone is volatile. Underlying its volatility is the very weak ability of states to monitor border movements. Rebel groups opposed to Rwanda and Burundi cross the DRC border with impunity. These are the FDLR/FOCA and the FNL opposed to the regimes in Rwanda and Burundi respectively. While the FDLR has fixed bases, FNL is transitory. Both groups have also cooperated to launch joint operations against the two states. Arms are also easy to smuggle across. An equally critical problem is that of landmines along the Ruzizi River which constitutes the border with DRC¹¹. There is also a problem of refugee movements. There exists a need for border demarcation especially between Burundi and Rwanda¹². Peace Accords among the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi on security issues have reduced tension among them to a very large extent. In the meantime Burundi has become a full participant of the Tri-Partite Agreement on Regional Security in the Great Lakes (cf. Zone 1)¹³.

It is hoped that the current international efforts, represented by MONUC in DRC and the UN operations in Burundi and more specifically national dialogues in both DRC and Burundi, will contribute to the stabilization of this zone, with particular concern to the refugee problem and its related environmental health effects. Yet, it must be noted that the international peace initiatives in DRC and Burundi are basically

⁹See Burundi, IC/GLR, Peace and Security, answers to the questionnaire and Rwanda, Peace and Security Questionnaire.

¹⁰ See Zambia: Peace and Security Team, Joint /Secretariat 21/4/05 Questionnaire Draft 2.

¹¹ See Burundi, IC/GLR, Peace and Security, answers to the questionnaire and Rwanda, Peace and Security Questionnaire.

¹² See Burundi, IC/GLR, Peace and Security, answers to the questionnaire and Rwanda, Peace and Security Questionnaire.

¹³ Therefore the mechanism is now called "Tri-Partite plus One".

addressing internal issues and are time specific hence the need for permanent structures.

Zone 11: The Kagera Triangle (Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda)

This zone is generally calm. Yet the frontiers, like many others, are porous and lacking surveillance equipment and human resources. Smuggling activities here are basically of economic nature. The types of conflict that are likely to occur currently are those pitting pastoralists against each other with respect to land. Border demarcation between Uganda and Rwanda and Uganda and Tanzania border is complete. Currently, there are some refugees who have crossed into Tanzania and Uganda¹⁴.

Zone 12: Rusumo Triangle (Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi)

This zone is bound to stabilize given the successful electoral process that has seen a new government emerge in Burundi. The zone suffers from land mines especially along the Burundi - Tanzania borders. The frontier between Burundi and Rwanda has sections that have not been demarcated, a factor that tends to foster conflicts among peasant farmers across the frontiers. The borders also experience levels of smuggling activities, cattle rustling and motor vehicle thefts. There are also movements of refugees seeking to get to Burundi from Tanzania.

5.2 Strategy

The fact that states cannot deal with insecurity and underdevelopment on their own, calls for a shared and common regional approach in the interest of all states concerned. This is predicated on the principle that perceives stability of the entire identified triangles (Zones) to be critical to the survival and stability of all the states of the region. Eventual sustainable stability will lay on the evolution of stakeholder mentality among states, communities and the region as a whole for a common and shared security. This approach also calls for evolution of development zones through which the existing dead capital can be activated to sustain economic security¹⁵. Art 53 of the Dar es Salaam Declaration makes reference to this idea by calling for the declaration of the GLR as a Special Zone for Reconstruction and Development (SZRD). While there are macro projects considered under the IC/GLR economic cluster, the security cluster has equally conceptualized regional micro-economic projects within specific triangles, under the project on "Development of Border Zones and Promotion of Human security in the Great Lakes Region" (IC/GLR project number 1.1.3), that seeks to enhance state, human and regional security.

¹⁴ See Uganda, answers to the questionnaire on Thematic Area of Peace and Security.

¹⁵ This is possible through activation of the existing dead capital in the identified Zones (See Project 1.1.3 on Development of Border Zones and Human Security). Among the dead capital here is what exists in form of potential capital such as communication infrastructure, energy, returns from tourism, capitalized land, fishing, fruits and mineral production. These are dead currently because they are dormant and thus need to be activated to be of use.

5.2.1 Objectives

To operationalize the concept of joint security management of common borders under the IC/GLR, the following overall goal is defined:

Security at common borders is ensured through a coordinated management approach for safe and stable border areas.

In order to achieve the overall goal, the following three objectives have been defined:

- The promotion of a common legal framework for border security (see 5.2.2);
- The development of a regional institutional framework for border security (see 5.2.3);
- The enhancement of capacity in dealing with border security (see 5.2.4).

5.2.2 The promotion of a common legal framework for border security

IC/GLR Member States have agreed to elaborate and sign a Protocol on Non-Aggression, Mutual Defence and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in the Great Lakes region. Further to that there is need for the member states in each zone to sign among them a MoU on the operationalization of these border zones. Efforts also have to be made to promote awareness of the protocol and the MoU among the public and legislators. National Committees will also be expected to organize forums of stakeholders to popularize these processes. An equally critical activity here will include a forum for parliamentary select committees on security and foreign affairs to internalize the protocol as a prelude to domesticating it through legislative process.

5.2.3 The development of a regional institutional framework for border security

Expected structures include a regional security structure encompassing all the 11 states in the IC/GLR initiative. This is the Heads of State and Government Summit under the proposed follow-up mechanism. Further to that, a zonal security structure grouping generally together three states (also referred to as security triangles) known as Zonal Conference on Security (Z-CONSEC) and a bilateral security structure to be known as Area Conference on Security (A-CONSEC) are foreseen. The bilateral areas structures will constitute the blocks on which the zonal and eventually the regional structures will be based. This will allow a sequence to be established with respect to border security management throughout the three levels. These structures will facilitate the creation of formal structures and forums through which security and conflict issues will be addressed in the process.

The three levels equally have the objective of helping to build mutually reinforcing confidence and trust building mechanisms. This process will begin at a bilateral and trilateral level before feeding into the wider regional level. This will cover all entry points (air, sea and land ports) into the region and states and the borderlines. Underlying the creation of these structures, is the absence of a wider regional structure within which border security can be set up. The planned “Protocol on Non-Aggression, Mutual Defense and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in the Great Lakes Region” as well as the Nanyuki MOU will contribute to enhance cooperation within these zones, and the IC/GLR.

IC/GLR Summits

This will be an institutionalized structure that will act as a forum for Heads of State in the region to deliberate on security, development and democracy issues. It will discuss Border Security Management issues concerning the 12 zones¹⁶. It will meet every two years_(except in cases of emergency) and it would decide on deployment of troops and sanctions depending on the specific case at hand. For immediate conflict management requirements a Troika of HoS that is, the outgoing chair, current and incoming, would take action. The Troika and IC/GLR Summit would receive advice on security, disaster management, refugees and conflict issues from relevant ministers of defense, interior and home affairs dealing with border security and from committees of experts concerned.

Zonal Conferences on Security (Z-CONSEC)

These are structured around points of intersection among borders, referred to as zones. These tripartite arrangements will allow states to resolve border security crisis of a tri-lateral nature. They will provide to ministers in charge a chance to discuss about border security management, common border assets management, modes of deployment of shared security assets and where there is the need, deployment of military units. Ministers could meet to deliberate on issues in the zone including issues arising at and referred to the A –CONSECS. Zones will report to the IC/GLR Summits.

Below the ministers level administrative officers within the zones will also regularly meet and develop agendas for the ministers under the leadership of the respective zone Secretariat Heads. States could opt to set up secretariats closer to the border points if they wish so. These could be headed by an officer seconded by one of the states constituting the zone. The position could rotate after each two years. The person in turn could head six desk officers from the three states (on rotational basis) in charge of small arms circulation, customs and migration, police, anti-terrorism, socio-economic activities and infrastructure. Under each officer will be two clerical officers.

States will equip zones with facilities such as HF radios for easy communication. It is expected that zones will promote the establishment of additional border posts, where it is deemed necessary. They will further be expected to:

- Initiate security cooperation, intelligence gathering and sharing;
- Facilitate information sharing and communication among states on border security issues;
- Elaborate border security sensitization campaigns in border areas;
- Security experts from the 11 states will meet to evolve a joint syllabus on border security management to be used in the 12 zones and area CONSECS in the forth quarter of the first year of their existence.

In the second year of existence, zones will be expected to:

¹⁶ A final decision on follow up mechanism is still pending, but will be made by the Member States of the IC/GLR before the Summit in Nairobi.

- Organize joint patrols, command and control of units (if it is deemed appropriate by the respective partners);
- Organize and set up links between the military and population in border zones;
- Organize the construction of border security roads and other security enhancing zonal micro economic activities;
- Undertake joint border monitoring and surveillance activities;
- Coordinate border mapping and demarcation;
- Zones will also handle training of border communities in border security management;
- The secretariats in the zone will also have the responsibility to organize forums for engagements and dialogues between civil society organizations and business sector on security, and intra-triangle movements of persons, goods and services;
- It is in such forums that issues of refugee movement across the triangle will be discussed;
- Issues of gender related violence in the triangles such the type experienced in pastoralist Zone 3 and Zone 1 will be handled in year two.
- Security of endangered communities living in forests straddling states, such as the Virunga, health issues and cross border disaster and coordination of tripartite environmental protection of flora and fauna, will also be handled in the second year. It is envisaged that they will commence with three pilot border communities from each zone.

The value of Z-CONSECS lies in the fact that they will create an environment within which verifications of rumors, discussions and confidence building mechanisms can be undertaken.

Area Conference of Security (A-CONSEC)

Below Z-CONSEC will be area-CONSECS. They will send bilateral border issues they cannot handle to Z-CONSEC. Where the issues in question affect more than two states, then the issues should be referred to the Z-CONSECS. A-CONSECS will report to and receive direction from Z-CONSECS. They could be headed by military commanders, police chiefs or administrators from border districts. States could opt to set up A- CONSEC secretariats if they wish so. Each secretariat could be headed by an officer seconded by one of the states constituting the area. The position could be rotational after each two years. He/she could head six desk officers from the three states (on rotational basis) in charge of small arms circulation, customs and migration, police, anti-terrorism, socio-economic activities and infrastructure. To enhance their operations they will be expected to liaise with zonal development units to maintain border security roads. They could also deal with cross border refugee movements and thus organize their safe return and reintegration.

A-CONSEC should be constituted in the third quarter by incorporating existing border commissions. Among their immediate activities should be setting up of border security forums that will include cross border security teams, civil society, business entities and border community representatives. Another immediate task is access of human rights organizations to borders, to monitor handling of persons at borders and the facilitation of cross border community dialogues. A-CONSECS will mediate inter community tensions. In their second year of existence:

- They will be expected to incorporate ongoing or initiate border demarcation exercises;
- Handle cross border community policing;
- Border security education activities;
- Capacity building for border communities;
- They should have been equipped with common resources converted from border security allocations in order to mount joint, monitoring and surveillance activities;
- A-CONSECs will also be expected to set up conflict and disaster early warning systems and to feed information into wider early warning systems such as the one maintained by IGAD or the one planned by AU.

By the third year of existence:

- There will be need to operationalize interdepartmental approaches to policing the frontiers at intra state and area levels. It is also suggested to organize joint training for customs and excise duty officials, migration and special border police forces.

A long term objective should be the computerization and the issuing out of identity cards by the states concerned and installation of computerized passport checks at border points. East African states are in the process of issuing East African I.D. cards. Border security management should help in this process by funding the scheme and subsequently extending it to other zones. Support for military units patrolling core zones like the coast of Kenya and Tanzania, Angola and the DRC which will need enhanced capacity in naval surveillance, can be undertaken after the third year or brought forward to the second year if external partners are interested to help. This task will have to be left to specialize units from either the eastern Brigade in collaboration with national naval units of Angola and DRC or East African defense forces and national units in the case of Kenya and Tanzania.

5.2.4 The Enhancement of Capacity in dealing with Border Security

There is need for material and financial inputs to create the aforementioned structures. Components like computer systems can be budgeted for by states for the second year. A and Z structures can be helped to deal with motorization through re-allocation of some of the existing state assets. This can be undertaken in the second year of existence. Upgrading of existing border posts can be undertaken by states in the second year. In addition, the enhancement of community capacity to undertake community policing can be initiated in second year to supplement the states. Additional posts, security stations, permanent encampments can be built in the third year. In the third year states can gather resources together to buy surveillance planes for zones and A-CONSECs. Border posts and patrol units must also be equipped with proper communication networks in the said year.

Training in border security management should begin in the second year. Border police units will have for instance to receive specialized and standardized training. The project envisages the best possible utilization of the available resources in the region such as training institutions like the National Defense College, Defense Staff Colleges in Kenya, Cadet Training College in Monduli (Tanzania), the Staff College in Uganda and C.I.D Training College in Kenya. Similar institutions also exist in Zambia.

For instance there is a Cadet Training College-MILTEZ in Kabwe and a Defense Services Command and Staff College in Lusaka.

The best approach would be to utilize some of the existing security institutions in the zones for collective training of border security officers. Core in training syllabus should be gender sensitive and human rights based border security management approaches. These should enable officers to increase human treatment of refugees and vulnerable groups. The more officers and men are trained together, the more the element of trust critical for border security will be enhanced. Additional training will be needed to enhance intelligence gathering and sharing capacity. Training costs and other assets like vehicles should not be a major issue given the fact that all states set aside allocations for these. All that will be needed would be for concerned departments to re-allocate these to the institutional structures proposed above.

6. Challenges and opportunities for setting up of Border Security Management

Collaboration in border security management is constrained by fear among states that others will cheat on any agreements reached in a bid to gain advantage over them¹⁷. Even though they sign agreements, they remain cautious and seek to maintain their own security. While this element is present in the Great Lakes Region, it should not be overrated. The signing of Dar-es-Salaam Declaration points to willingness to create verification mechanisms to respond to these fears.

Political will is needed to open up for a regional approach for joint security management of common borders. The argument here should be that border security management actually enhances state security and sovereignty. It should be mentioned here that all Regional Economic Communities¹⁸ (RECs) which draw member states from the IC/GLR countries in a joint meeting with the IC/GLR member states have declared their support to such efforts. A constant constraining factor in cooperation activities in Africa is the financial resources question. This should not be the case with respect to setting up or formalizing existing border commissions and zones. Financial costs are apparent at the level of capacity building. While development partners can help in the initial phase of these processes, states can take up the costs once the cooperation mechanisms are in place. Underlying this is the fact that there will be heavy savings accruing out of the reduction of tensions and shared border security management. In terms of collaborative partners, there are multi-lateral and bilateral partners who could help in this process. They include initiatives by the UK, USA, and France in helping to build peace keeping capacity under respectively British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT), African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and, Reinforcement of African Peace keeping capacities (RECAMP). Border security frameworks through CONSECs can also tap from anti-terror support initiatives to build capacity. Zonal and area approach to border security management should allow coordinated engagement by various development partners in the process enhancing coordination.

¹⁷ K. Waltz: Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981 p. 88

¹⁸ CEMAC, CEPGL, COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, IGAD, SADC

7. Value Added

The value of border security management structures lies in the fact that they can be set up immediately to help build confidence and trust among states. At operational level, they will allow the evolution of forums and mechanisms for civil society cooperation on mutual human and state security. An operational joint border security management system will enable states to not only share resources and enhance their security, but that they will also be able to contain smuggling activities, trafficking of humans, arms and natural resources. These structures equally have the capacity of playing an important role in conflict prevention, management and resolution. They can also be used to manage refugee movements across borders.

8. Budget Issues

With strong political will, these frameworks can enhance security for states. They can also immediately help to build a sense of trust among them. What are needed at the initial stage are budgetary allocations for border security management to be utilized in a collective fund for Z-A CONSEC activities. Future allocations will be derived from economic activities located in border economic zones. States can also think of setting up a special tax for this. It will also be noted that security costs are likely to go down once tensions will be reduced. These savings can be allocated to regional border security management structures. However for faster consolidation of these structures, especially at the level of assets and training, external support would be critical. The same can also be said about surveillance of seas and ocean borderline as is the case with Kenya, Tanzania, DRC, and Angola. It is suggested that state delegations make proposals here on estimated costs of these complements.

Annex: List of Abbreviations

A-CONSEC	Area Conference on Security
ACRI	African Crisis Response Initiative
ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
AU	African Union
BMATT	British Military Advisory and Training Team
BOSEAL	Border Seal
CAR	Central African Republic
CEEAC/ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
CEPGL	Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning System
C.I.D.	Criminal Investigation Department
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COPAX	Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East African Community
EX-FAR	Former Rwandese Armed Forces (Forces armees rwandaïses)
FDLR/FOCA	Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda
FNL	National Liberation Forces
GLR	Great Lakes Region
HF	High Frequency
IC/GLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
I.D.	Identity
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MILTEZ	Military Training Establishment of Zambia
MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
PRA	Peoples Redemption Army
RECAMP	Reinforcement of African Peace keeping capacities
RoC	Republic of Congo
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SZRD	Special Zone for Reconstruction and Development
TTTF	Technical Thematic Task Force
UK	United Kingdom
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
USD	United States Dollar
WNBF	West Nile Bank Front
Z-CONSEC	Zonal Conference on Security

V. Result Framework, Work plan and Budget (Version of 21 September 2006)

Project Title:		JOINT SECURITY MANAGEMENT OF COMMON BORDERS																	
Overall Objective:		Security at common borders is ensured through a coordinated management approach for safe and stable border areas																	
Intended Outcome:		Regional mechanisms for addressing border security issues, peaceful state and cross border community co-existence, evolution of marked and well protected frontiers, early warning mechanism, and military and long-term border co-operation.																	
Outcome indicator:		Emergence of collaborative GL, Zonal and area frameworks on security, increased information sharing, coordinated border surveillance, clearly delineated borders, New security compliant National Ids, enforced joint border patrols, HR sensitive border security measures, gender sensitive cross border protection measures, cross border community and environmental protection																	
Partnership Strategy:		The project will support existing informal structures for border security management, formal structures for peace keeping such as the Eastern Brigade, Uganda- Rwanda Military commission, Uganda, DRC, Rwanda and Burundi tripartite plus one arrangements, EAC efforts for common security and defense policies. SADC and IGAD early warning systems, BMATT, ACRI, RECAMP, UN and AU initiatives in the GLR.																	
	Expected results	Indicative Activities	Calendar												Resp. Partner	Foreseen Budget (Total 55'695'319)			
			2007				2008				2009-11					Finan c. Res.	Description of Budget	Amount in USD	
			Q 1	Q 2	Q 3	Q 4	Q 1	Q 2	Q 3	Q 4	Q 1	Q 2	Q 3	Q 4					
Objective 1: The promotion of a common legal framework																			
1.1.1	Signing of MoUs on border security collaboration. <u>Benchmark indicator</u> : MoUs signed	Promote the signing of memorandums of understanding for operationalizing the Border Zones through government meetings																1 Meeting of 15 participants on total 3 days in each zone, incl. of legal expert and interpreters Translation of documents @31'150 per zone	373'800
1.1.2		Facilitation of signing of legal instruments on structures operationalization														Joint Sec & GoF	Govt.	Travel and accommodation for Ministers Incl. Promotion in media (82'500)	267'500

1.1.3		Translation and distribution of the legal instruments to AU and to the public																Translation, travel and dispatch promotion on radios	113'250
1.2.1	Increased awareness on the protocols and the MoUs amongst the public and members of legislative assemblies' security committees	Organize Stakeholder forums for public sensitization															Nat. Prep. Com	3 days Workshops in 11 countries (50p) @ 18,700 USD each	205'700
1.2.2		Organize a forum for the Parliamentary Select Committees on Security and Foreign Affairs on the need to internalize the Protocol on Non-Aggression....															Govt.	Govt	Govt. Briefings in the House
Objective 2 : The development of a regional institutional framework for border security																			
2.1.1	12 zonal Structures and all area structures established and operational	Establishment of zonal Secretariats in 12 zones																Human resources: 12 x 685,519 = 8'226,224 Office, Equipment and op. costs: 12 x 162,150 = 1'945,800	10'172'024
2.1.2		Establishment of area secretariats and structures																	Human resources: 36 x 685,519 = 24'678'684 Office, Equipment and op. costs: 36 x 162,150 = 5'837'400

2.3.4	cross-border issues	Elaborate and implement a public information campaign on border security management																	Contracts for public relations services 12 campaigns @ ≈25.000 per zone	300'000
2.3.5		Design and implement a training programme on border security management for border communities																	12 Experts for progr. design (2 months) @ 10.500 each = 252'000, training of 25 trainers @ 1,050 each = 26'250, 25 trainings @ 500 each = 12'500	290'750
2.3.6		Provision of communication equipment for border community policing																	3 sets of walkies talkies per zone	28'800
Objective 3 : The enhancement of capacity in dealing with border security																				
3.1.1	Improved operational capacities of military and civilian border authorities	Development of training concept and syllabus																	11 national experts 1 regional seminar	171'100
3.1.2	Benchmark indicators : # of trained security forces	Stocktaking of existing facilities, identification of structures and personnel, funding mechanism																	Human resources from zone secretariats	n/a
3.1.3	# of trained civilians # of patrols decrease in border incidents, clashes, crimes	Improve the capacities of border authorities, zonal secretariats and area units with communication																	three HF radios per zone @ 7,500 per zone	90'000 Gvt
3.2.1	Increased awareness, research and strategic planning on border security	Increase linkages and cooperation between security personnel (police, military, customs) and civilians																	12 joint meetings, public information, training and monitoring for 36,450 per zone	437'500

3.2.2	Benchmark indicators : # of research on border security management introduction of border security management in national and district development plans	Identify research institutes in the GLR dealing with border security related issues													Gvt.		Human resources from zone secretariats	n/a
3.2.3		Promote networking among research institutes and scholars, facilitate research													Gvt.		Human resources from zone secretariats	n/a
3.2.4		External audit and evaluation															one Audit and Evaluation per year and per zone @15000USD	720,000
																	Subtotal	50'632'108
																	10 % of unforeseen	5'063'211
																	OVERALL TOTAL	55.695.319

Detailed budget:

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